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and the President 
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James M. McCormick 
The domestic politics of contra aid during the Reagan administration 
is a story of both success and failure. It is a story of success in that 
public preferences on the issue were mirrored in congressional behav-
ior and ultimately constrained presidential action in a manner roughly 
consistent with the expectations of democratic theory. It is story of 
failure in that the president of the United States fought a long political 
battle against a determined domestic opposition and came up short. 
That fact distinguishes this case from most other presidential foreign 
policy initiatives. Truman enjoyed overwhelming support for his op-
position to communism in Southeastern Europe, as did Eisenhower for 
his posture toward the spread of communism in the Middle East, John-
son initially for the use of military force against communist forces in 
Indochina, and Carter for his pledge to protect the Persian Gulf region 
from Soviet intrusion. Even Kennedy's failed efforts against Castro's 
Cuba won him applause at the time. But Ronald Reagan failed in his 
attempt to persuade Congress and the American people that the threat 
of communism in Central American required the same determination 
abroad and support at home that his predecessors bad enjoyed in argu-
ably analogous situations. 
Reagan came to Washington determined to exorcise the ghost of 
Vietnam, but his efforts to deal harshly with the Sandinista regime 
ultimately fell victim to the enduring effects of the tragic conflict in 
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Southeast Asia. Before Vietnam, the United States enjoyed a broad-
based consensus about the nation's appropriate world role (Chace 1978; 
Wittkopf 1990; Wittkopf and McCormick 1990a). Since Vietnam, for-
eign policy has been the subject of often bitter partisan and ideological 
dispute-arguably to its detriment (Destler, Gelb, and Lake 1984). On 
no issue was that rancor more in evidence than on the Reagan ad-
ministration's policies toward Nicaragua. 
Whether the outcome of the politics of contra aid is viewed as a 
success or a failure-the choice of terms will itself doubtless be col-
ored by partisan and ideological considerations-a more thoroughgo-
ing examination of the issue can contribute to a richer understanding 
of how public opinion affects American foreign policy. At issue is how 
the domestic politics of contra aid in the post-Vietnam environment 
militated against realization of the administration's preferred policies.• 
The climate of opinion aptly captures the theoretical importance of 
the so-called Vietnam syndrome. Both concepts figure prominently in 
the subsequent analyses. The latter refers to the introspection preva-
lent in the United States since the early 1970s that discouraged inter-
ventionist behavior generally and the prolonged use of military forces 
abroad. The former refers to the foreign policy decision-making envi-
ronment that "by creating in the policy-maker an impression of a public 
attitude or attitudes, or by becoming part of the environment and cultural 
milieu that help to shape his own thinking, may consciously affect his 
official behavior" (Cohen I 957, 29). The climate of opinion concept 
also refers to what decision makers "(perceive] to be operative as latent 
public attitudes or as manifest but unstructured majorities" (Rosenau 
1961, 23). Policymakers frequently seek to create a climate of opinion 
"more favorable to their contemplated policy, hoping in this way to 
affect the perceptions of other decision-makers who are either opposed 
to the projected proposal or not yet persuaded of its wisdom" (Rosenau 
1961, 24). Thus the climate of opinion may permeate the decision process 
through various routes, including top-down channels from decision makers 
to opinion makers, bottom-up channels from opinion makers to deci-
sion makers, and intermediate channels as well (Rosenau 196 I , 19-
26). All of these apply to the Vietnam syndrome as that term has been 
used variously by policymakers, journalists, and academics. The pre-
cise mechanism whereby internalization of the climate of opinion occurs 
and is transmitted into the policy process admittedly remains problem-
atic (Cohen 1972). Still , the concept usefully draws attention to the 
reasons why political leaders, the mass media, and interest groups engage 
in efforts to shape public opinion.2 • 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how the post-Vietnam eli -
I 
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mate of opinion affected the desire of the Reagan admin istration to 
provide aid to the Nicaraguan contras. The inquiry focuses attention 
on several questions central to democratic theory and practice: What 
is the nature of public opinion regarding foreign policy issues? What 
accounts for the consistency of public opinion on the issue of contra 
aid? What were the sources of public opinion on contra aid? Did Congress 
reflect public attitudes? What was the relationship between Reagan's 
popularity and the popularity of his policies? Ultimately, the question 
is whether public opinion constrained the president, preventing him 
from doing what he otherwise would have preferred. 
The examination begins with the structure of mass foreign policy 
beliefs that emerged in the wake of the Vietnam War and how attitudes 
toward Central American policy were both a part of and a victim of the 
climate of opinion about the nation's appropriate world role engen-
dered by that war. 
PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY: 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Conventional wisdom holds that the American people are incapable 
of holding consistent and stable foreign policy attitudes. The view-
point can be traced in part to Gabriel Almond's influential book, The 
American People and Foreign Policy (1950; also Converse 1964), which 
ascribed a "moodishness" to the American people about foreign policy 
issues that grew naturally out of their relative indifference to foreign 
policy except in times of crisis and peril. Almond ( 1950, 53) argued 
that "the characteristic response to questions of foreign policy is one 
of indifference. A foreign policy crisis, short of the immediate threat 
of war, may transform indifference to vague apprehension, to fatalism, 
to anger; but the reaction is still a mood, a superficial and fluctuating 
response." 
The reasons for this unflattering description and the inference that 
public opinion is largely irrelevant to the making of American foreign 
policy can be traced to the well-established beliefs that the American 
people are, relative speaking, uninterested in and ill-informed about 
foreign policy, and that they have a corresponding penchant to evince 
unstable foreign policy attitudes highly susceptible to manipulation by 
political elites. 
There is no doubt that the mass of the American people typically 
Jack interest in and knowledge about foreign policy, but these charac-
teristics are largely irrelevant to whether the American people are able, 
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in the aggregate, to hold politically relevant foreign policy beliefs. Over 
two decades ago, V. 0. Key put it best in his discussion of the "con-
text" of public opinion and how it can affect governmental action: 
That context is not a rigid matrix that fixes a precise form for govern-
ment action. Nor is it unchangeable. It consists of opinion irregularly 
distributed among the people and of varying intensity, of attitudes of 
differing convertibility into votes, and of sentiments not always readily 
capable of appraisal. Yet that context, as it is perceived by those respon-
sible for action, conditions many of the acts of those who must make 
what we may call "opinion-related decision." The opinion context may 
affect the substance of action, the form of action, or the manner of 
action. (Key 1961 , 423) 
Almond's "mood theory" has not gone unchallenged. Drawing on 
poll data from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, William Caspary ( 1970, 
546) demonstrated that the American people possess a "strong and stable 
'permissive mood' toward international involvement" and that "such 
a mood provides a blank check for foreign policy adventures, not just 
a responsible support for international organization, genuine foreign 
assistance, and basic defense measures." In short, the "mood" of the 
American people is not nearly as unstable and quixotic as Almond implied, 
although historically it hardly served as an effective check on 
policymakers. 
More recently analysts have drawn on social cognition theory to 
explain how foreign policy opinions can be structured and maintained 
even in the face of a paucity of information. Jon Hurwitz and Mark 
Peffley (1987), for example, argue that individuals utilize "heuristics," 
or information shortcuts, to make political j udgments and to relate 
preferences toward specific foreign policy issues to general attitudes. 
Thus, paradoxically, ordinary citizens hold coherent attitude structures 
because they Jack detailed knowledge about foreign policy: " individu-
als organize information because such organization helps to simplify 
the world. Thus, a paucity of information does not impede structure 
and consistency; on the contrary, it motivates the development and 
employment of structure. Thus, ... individual s [attempt] to cope with 
an extraordinarily confusing world (with limited resources to pay in-
formation costs) by structuring views about specific foreign policies 
according to their more general and abstract beliefs" (Hurwitz and Peffley 
1987, 11 14). 
In the particular case of contra aid, many Americans lacked even 
elementary knowledge about some of the specifics pertaining to U.S. 
policies in Central American during the Reagan presidency (Ameri-
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cans Talk Security 1989, 299-300; Ladd 1983, 21; Ladd 1987, 23; 
LeoGrande 1990; Sobel 1989, 120). But they were nonetheless firm 
and unwavering in their convictions about whether American troops 
should be sent to fight in the region and about the wisdom of pursuing 
policies they feared might result in that eventuality. From the point of 
view of policy makers in Washington, these convictions are the impor-
tant, politically relevant data. The story of contra aid thus becomes 
part of a growing body of knowledge that demonstrates the ability of 
the American people to embrace and maintain stable and politically 
relevant foreign policy attitudes important to an understanding of the 
domestic sources of American foreign policy (see also Graham 1988; 
Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, 1990; Shapiro and Page 1988; Wittkopf 1990). 
That insight is important in placing the struggle over contra aid within 
the larger context of the changes in mass foreign policy beliefs that 
occurred in the wake of Vietnam. 
AFTER VIETNAM: THE DOMESTIC 
CLIMATE OF FOREIGN POLICY OPINION 
The belief that politics stops at the water's edge has perhaps always 
been more myth than reality (McCormick and Wittkopf 1990), but the 
extent to which foreign policy has became the object of often bitter 
partisan and ideological dispute since Vietnam compared with the 
consensual beliefs seemingly so self-evident in the 1950s and 1960s 
has evoked widespread commentary among scholars, journalists, and 
policymakers. As Zbigniew Brzezinski observed in commenting on the 
breakdown of the Cold War consensus: 
Our foreign policy became increasingly the object of contestation, of 
sharp cleavage, and even of some reversal of traditional political com-
mitments. The Democratic Party, the party of internationalism, became 
increasingly prone to the appeal of neo-isolationism. And the Republi-
can Party, the party of isolationism, became increasingly prone to the 
appeal of militant interventioni sm. And both parties increasingly found 
their center of gravity shifting to the extreme, thereby further polarizing 
our public opinion. (Brzezinski 1984, 15-16) 
In the years following World War II isolationism gave way to inter-
nationalism as the dominant philosophy undergirding American for-
eign policy. Internationalism implied conflict as well as cooperation 
with other nations. The United States sought cooperation with other 
nations but would resort to intervention, including force, if necessary. 
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The arrows and olive branch in the eagle's talons in the great seal of 
the United States provide a fitting symbol of the duality of internation-
alism. As isolationism gradually, sometimes fitfully, gave way, a fun-
damental consensus emerged about the nation's world role that came 
to be reflected in the themes of globalism, anticommunism, contain-
ment, military might, and interventionism (Kegley and Wittkopf 1991). 
Domestic discord was often evident, but the foreign policy consensus 
muted differences at home as the nation pursued its mission abroad. 
A number of developments during the 1970s contributed to the 
breakdown of the foreign policy consensus of the Cold War years. The 
Vietnam trauma was the primary catalyst, but it was reinforced by the 
onset of detente with the Soviet Union and the Watergate episode. Together 
they challenged the assumptions on which the consensus had been built, 
including the beliefs that American military power by itself could achieve 
the objectives of American foreign policy; that containment was the 
cornerstone of American foreign policy; that American political insti-
tutions were uniquely virtuous; and that a presidency preeminent in 
foreign policy was necessary to cope with the challenges of a hostile 
world. The Cold War foreign policy consensus thus dissipated as the 
American people became divided not only over the question of whether 
the United States should be involved in world affairs-which tradi-
tionally had divided them along internationalist-isolationist lines-but 
also how it ought to be involved-which now raised questions about 
the ends of American foreign policy as well as its means. 
As differences about ends and means emerged, support for interna-
tionalism, which for two decades had sustained an active U.S. role in 
world affairs, began to manifest different faces. One is captured in the 
phrase cooperative internationalism, the other in militant internation-
alism (Wittkopf 1990).3 Attitudes toward communism, the use of American 
troops abroad, and relations with the Soviet Union distinguish propo-
nents and opponents of the alternative forms of internationalism. They 
in turn give rise to four distinct foreign policy belief systems: inter-
nationalists , isolationists, accommodationists, and hardliners. Consis-
tent with traditional views of Americans ' attitudes toward the role of 
the United States in world affairs, internationalists are those who support 
active American involvement in international affairs, favoring a com-
bination of conciliatory and conflict strategies reminiscent of the pre-
Vietnam internationalist foreign policy paradigm. Isolationists, on the 
other hand , oppose both types of international invol vement, as expected. 
The two remaining groups, appropriately regarded as selective inter-
nationalists, are newly emergent in the 1970s. Accommodationists embrace 
the tenets of cooperative internationalism but reject the elements implicit 
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in militant internationalism, while hardliners manifest just the oppo-
site beliefs. 
The preferences of accommodationists and hardliners are closely 
correlated with liberal and conservative political ideologies and with 
the lessons drawn from the Vietnam experience (Holsti and Rosenau 
1984; Wittkopf 1990). As a result, the post-Vietnam climate of opinion 
has often evoked sharply divergent domestic responses to issues re-
lated to the involvement of the United States in the affairs of others 
and especially toward the use of troops abroad. This fact provides 
important insight into the domestic discord that marked the Reagan 
administration's Central American policies from early in 1981 until it 
left office eight years later. 
THE CONTOURS OF PUBLIC 
OPINION TOWARD CONTRA AID 
The divided character of public opinion in the post- Vietnam era which 
the Reagan administration faced was exacerbated by the fact that a 
Republican president confronted a Democrat-controlled and often re-
calcitrant House of Representatives. To win congressional approval 
for aid to the anti-Sandinista forces in Central America, on several 
occasions President Reagan appealed his case to the American people 
directly, going over the heads of Congress in nationally televised speeches, 
radio broadcasts, and appeals to various organizations. The imagery 
evoked by the Great Communicator called upon some of the most centrist 
values in the nation's foreign pol icy experience. The contras were 
variously described as "freedom fighters" and "our brothers," while 
those opposing aid to the insurgents were labeled "new isolationists," 
who, by pretending that "the strategic threat" in Nicaragua will go 
away, "are courting disaster and history will hold them accountable." 
The president and other top administration officials described the "stra-
tegic threat" as "another Cuba"; "a privileged sanctuary for terrorists 
and subversives just two days driving time from Harlingen, Texas"; "a 
permanent staging ground for terrorism ... just three hours by air from 
the U.S. border. " 4 Ultimately, the president asked rhetorically in a 
nationally televised speech on March 16, 1986, in what was part of an 
intensive campaign to win approval for $100 million in contra aid, 
"Will we give the Nicaraguan democratic resistance the means to re-
capture their betrayed revolution, or will we turn our backs and ignore 
the malignancy in Managua until it spreads and becomes a mortal threat 
to the entire New World ?" 
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The monies involved were comparatively trivial,5 but Congress 
remained reluctant, and the American people were not moved. When 
asked in an ABC News/Washington Post survey in March 1986 whether 
they approved of the refusal by the House to provide the $100 million 
Reagan had sought, 60 percent said yes . The proportion was nearly 
identical to other surveys that had asked related questions. In July 1985, 
63 percent of those polled by the Louis Harris organization responded 
that they sided with Congress in its dispute with the president about 
sending military aid to the contra rebels , as did 61 percent in a January 
1987 Harris poll. In this sense Congress, and particularly the House, 
where the specter of "another Vietnam" was repeatedly invoked, seemed 
to respond to and reflect public preferences in the tug-of-war over contra 
aid (a point examined in more detail below) . 
Public opinion was also remarkably stable and cons istent over the 
course of the long-simmering executive-legislative conflict (see Table 
4-12). In an August 1983 Harris survey, roughly two-thirds of the American 
people expressed opposition to "arming and supporting the rebels in 
Nicaragua who are trying to overthrow the Sandinista government in 
that country." Three years later, in a June 1986 ABC News/Washington 
Post survey, 62 percent opposed "granting military and other aid to the 
Nicaraguan rebels known as the 'contras. "'In these and other surveys, 
the American people demonstrated a remarkably consistent and pre-
dictable foreign policy posture (cf. Ladd 1983, 1987). 
Two of the surveys used to document the cooperative (CI) and militant 
internationalism (MI) dimensions described above (see endnote 3), one 
conducted in 1982 and the other in 1986, contain several questions 
about Central America that illustrate graphically how Americans' di-
vergent foreign policy beliefs related to Reagan administration policy 
options. The questions had to do with how threatening to the United 
States a communist El Salvador would be and whether support would 
be forthcoming for the use of U.S. troops in El Salvador if its govern-
ment were about to be defeated by leftist rebels, if Nicaragua permit-
ted the Soviet Union to set up a missile base in Nicaragua, or if Nicaragua 
invaded Honduras in an effort to destroy contra bases there. In all of 
these cases the questions were used to construct the CI/MJ dimensions; 
thus, the responses to them are not independent of the classification 
scheme, but they give some sense of how Americans' foreign policy 
beliefs affected their attitudes toward Central America, as shown in 
Table 5-l. Roughly equal proportions of respondents fell in each belief 
category. 
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Table 5-l 
The Relationship between Foreign Policy Beliefs 
and Attitudes toward Policy Options in Central Ameri ca 
8 1 
Internationalists Accommodatjonjsts Hardliners Jsolatjonjsts 
Percentage Believing a Communist El Salvador Would Be Somewhat or a Great Threat 
to the United States 
1986 
1982 
92 
82 
46 
41 
Percentage Supporting the Use of Troops in El Salvador 
1986 33 10 
1982 30 6 
88 
84 
45 
32 
Percentage Supporting the Use of Troops against Nicaragua in 1986 
54 
43 
10 
8 
If missile base 58 27 67 26 
If Honduras 33 8 40 14 
invaded 
What is striking is how widely divergent accommodationi sts and 
hardliners are on these issues, a difference that lies at the heart of the 
anticommunis t, interventionist thrust characteristic of pos t-World War 
II American foreign policy. By a two-to-one margin , hardliners attached 
considerably greater salience to a communist El Salvador than did 
accommodationists; by a four- or five-to-one margin they would have 
supported the use of troops in El Salvador; and by a five-to-one margin 
they would have supported the use of troops against Nicaragua in the 
event it invaded Honduras. 
Similar disparities are evident in attitudes toward Reagan adminis-
tration policies (items not used to construct the CI and MI dimensions). 
In 1982, for example, 30 percent of the hardliners evaluated the 
adminis tration's handling of the conflict in EI Salvador as good or 
excellent compared with 15 percent of the accommodationists. Simi-
larly, in 1986 hardliners rated the administration's efforts to topple the 
Nicaraguan government as good or excellent by a 37 to 13 percent 
margin compared with the accommodationists. Hardliners in tha t year 
also supported the use of economic and military aid as instruments of 
the Reagan Doctrine by a three-to-one margin over accommodationists. 
Thus it is reasonable to infer that support for contra aid would be greatest 
among those imbued with hard-line foreign policy values and least among 
those who embrace accommodationist beliefs. Inasmuch as the issue 
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was often perceived not as a matter of aiding another nation but as an 
interventionist issue, isolationists and a sizable proportion of interna-
tionalists could be expected to have coalesced with accommodationists 
to create the mass political coalition of contra aid opponents that so 
persistently dogged the president's efforts.6 
SOURCES OF OPINION ON CONTRA AID 
The foregoing evidence demonstrates that the Reagan administration 's 
controversial policy of support for the contra rebels fueled perhaps 
latent but still intensely partisan and ideological divisions among the 
American people and in Congress. Thus the political battle over contra 
aid is a striking illustration of the absence of a national consensus on 
the ends and means of American foreign policy evident throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. It also illustrates the patterned nature of American 
foreign policy opinion. Policy divisions over contra aid found expres-
sion in Americans' partisan attachments and ideological predisposi-
tions, their retrospective attitudes about the Vietnam War and 
interventionism, and their trust in American political leaders. 
PARTISANSHIP, IDEOLOGY, AND 
SUPPORT FOR CONTRA AID 
The sharply partisan and ideological character of domestic conten-
tion over the issue of contra aid is evident from the political configu-
ration of the administration's supporters within the mass public. If 
differences between Republican and Democrat supporters on the sur-
vey items used in Tables 4-15 and 5-2 were shown, they would range 
from as little as 9 percent in September 1983 on the issue of arming 
and supporting rebels seeking to overthrow the Sandinista government 
to as much as 35 percent in January 1987 on the question of sending 
military aid to the contras with 21 percent as the average. Similar ranges 
are evident between liberals and conservatives, where the average split 
is 19 percent. More important than these numbers is the story they tell 
of persistent, predictable differences in the American polity through 
time and across divergent circumstances-and despite persistent presi-
dential efforts to build consensual support for the administration's 
preferred policies. 
The outlines of the battle for public opinion were set early in the 
administration's first term, when El Salvador, not Nicaragua, was the 
The Domestic Politics of Contra Aid 
Table 5-2 
Public Support for Contra Aid, 1985-87 
I. Military aid 
Disapprove Approve Not sure/both/neither 
mm ~ {Eill!Q[ B.!:lllliiDl {QI!I!!l~ll Rlli!Ki!Dl !l!ln'l kDQWlDQ !ll!iDiQD 
1.1 5/85 
1.2 3/86 
1.3 7/85 
1.4 1/87 
II . Nonmilitary aid 
11.1 
11.2 
11.3 
~ 
5/85 
7/85 
4/86 
25% 
35% 
29% 
29% 
EilY.!u ~ 
41% 54% 
43% 51 % 
40% 54% 
Ill. Military and nonmilitary aid 
71% 4% 
60% 4% 
63% 8% 
61% 9% 
NQ! sur~:lno !ll!iDi!lnl!l!lD'l kn2w 
6% 
6% 
6% 
~ EilY.!u ~ NQ! sur~:IDQ !ll!iDiQn/dQD't JIDQW 
Ill.! 
111.2 
lll.3 
4/86 
6/86 
10/86 
I. Military aid 
35% 
29% 
32% 
60% 
62% 
59% 
5% 
9% 
9% 
83 
Nl.uilW 
1,256 
1,204 
1,252 
1,249 
1,257 
1,244 
1,254 
Nl.uilW 
1,254 
1,564 
1,207 
1.1 : Do you favor or oppose the United States sending $14 million in military aid to the 
rebels in Nicaragua? (Harris). 
1.2: The House of Representatives has refused Reagan' s request for $100 million in mili -
tary aid to the contras in Nicaragua. Do you approve or disapprove of the action by the 
House? (ABC News/Washington Post) . 
1.3: Recently President Reagan bas had some serious disagreements with Congress. Now 
who do you think was more right- Reagan or Congress-in their differences over ... 
sending military aid to the contra rebels in Nicaragua, which is favored by Reagan but 
opposed by Congress? (Harris). 
!.4: If you had a say, who do you think will be more right-Reagan or the Congress-in 
their difference over ... sending military aid to the contra rebels in Nicaragua, which is 
favored by Reagan but opposed by Congress? (Harris). 
II. Nonmilitary aid 
!1.1 Do you favor or oppose the United States sending $14 million in nonmilitary aid to 
the rebels and other groups who are opposed to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua? 
(Harris). 
1! .2: Who do you think was more right-Reagan or Congress-in their differences over 
... sending nonmilitary aid to the contras in Nicaragua, which is favored by Reagan but 
opposed by Congress? [Note: affirmative equated with Reagan( (Harris). 
11.3: Do you favor or oppose the United States sending just $30 million in nonmilitary aid 
to the contra rebels in Nicaragua? (Harris). 
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llJ. Military and nonmilitary aid 
JII.l : Do you favor or oppose tbe United States sending $ 100 million in military and 
nonmilitary aid to the contra rebels in Nicaragua? (Harri s). 
lll.2: Congress has authorized that $100 million in milita ry and nonmilitary aid should be 
sent by the United States to the rebels fighting against the government in Nicaragua. Do 
you favor or oppose sending that aid to the rebels in Nicaragua? (Harris). 
III.3: Do you generally favor or oppose the United States granting military and other aid 
to tbe Nicaraguan rebels known as the "contras"? (ABC New s/Washington Post). 
policy focus. In March 1981, less than two month s after Reagan's 
inauguration, a Harris poll found that only 44 percent of the respon-
dents favored sending military advisers to El Salvador and that less 
than 30 percent favored sending either economic or military aid. The 
questions were repeated a year later, but, surprisingly given the typical 
penchant of the public to acquiesce to governmental initiatives, the 
support levels for all three actually declined. Then, still another year 
later, in April 1983, when the question about sending military advisers 
to El Salvador was repeated and two others on economic aid were asked, 
the levels of support and opposition returned to what they had been in 
1981. Moreover, the responses to many of these questions elicited the 
same partisan and ideological differences that would later characterize 
the contra aid issue, illustrating once again that Reagan 's policies enjoyed 
their greatest support among Republicans and conservatives. 
PARTISANSHIP, IDEOLOGY, AND 
SUPPORT FOR INTERVENTIONISM 
These partisan and philosophical differences track the differences 
between hardliners and accommodationists described earlier, who di-
verge sharply in their assessments about the utility of interventionism 
as an instrument of policy and particularly on the utility of military 
force . Concern for whether and under what conditions the American 
people will support the use of force in pursuit of foreign policy objec-
tives is an enduring consequence of the Vietnam War. In a speech on 
"The Uses of Military Power" in November 1984, Secretary of De-
fense Caspar Weinberger, drawing on the lessons of Vietnam and Korea, 
suggested that U.S. military forces should be committed to combat 
only when vital interests are at stake, when the political and military 
objectives are clearly defined, when the United States has "the clear 
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intention of winning," and when the support of Congress and the American 
people is assured (Halloran 1984, AS). Clearly these are difficult re-
quirements to meet, but the restrictions seem to fit the public mood. 
The invasion of Grenada in October 1983 arguably fit these condi-
tions. Certainly it was popular. A Harris poll shortly after the invasion 
showed, for example, that, by a 73-27 percent split, respondents be-
lieved Reagan was right to invade the tiny island. The responses track 
historical patterns, which show that presidents can generally count on 
the American people to rally round the flag in times of crisis and peril. 
Was the lesson of Grenada that the American people would support 
the use of troops in Central America? The March 1983 Harris poll cited 
above asked respondents if they would support sending troops to El 
Salvador. Only 26 percent said they would. Eight months later, in the 
October poll by Harris following the invasion of Grenada, respondents 
were asked if they favored "continuing the same policy we followed 
in Grenada of sending in troops to overthrow other unfriendly govern-
ments in the Caribbean, Central America, and South America." By a 
37-54 split the answer was " no." Moreover, even on the Grenada issue 
marked differences were evident in the opinions of partisan identifiers 
and those of different ideological persuasions. Whereas 88 percent of 
the Republicans surveyed supported the invasion, only 65 percent of 
the Democrats did. And whereas more than four-fifths of those who 
regarded themselves as conservatives supported the invasion, only half 
of the liberal s did. 
As noted earlier, fear of another Vietnam and disagreements about 
its lessons figure prominently in the differences evident in the foreign 
policy beliefs of the American people. Retrospective judgments about 
the war also affect the willingness of the American people to support 
the use of troops elsewhere. Beginning in 1974, each of the quadren-
nial Gallup polls sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Rela-
tions (see note 3 here) asked respondents how strongly they agreed or 
disagreed with the propos ition that "The Vietnam War was more than 
a mistake, it was fundamentally wrong and immoral." They were also 
asked about circumstances in which the United States might use troops 
abroad. Although there is no one-to-one correspondence between the 
two, the responses tend to be related systematically (Wittkopf l990a 
176). 
The Democratic majority in the Hou se, led by House Speaker Tip 
O ' Neill , repeatedly drew on the Vietnam analogy in its opposition to 
Reagan's contra aid policies. In O' Neill's words, "I see us becoming 
86 Part Two, Chapter Five 
engaged, step-by-step, in a military situation that brings our boys di-
rectly into fighting" (Roberts 1986b, Al2). Evidence that the Ameri-
can people shared that fear is compelling, if not conclusive. Sixty-one 
percent of the respondents in the March 1981 Harris poll responded 
that El Salvador could become another Vietnam, and the proportion 
grew to 72 percent a year later. Similarly, in August 1983, when Harris 
added Nicaragua to El Salvador in the question that asked whether 
"U.S. involvement ... looks too much as though it could turn out to 
be another Vietnam for this country," 66 percent again said yes. Harris 
also asked in May 1985 and again in April and October 1986, "How 
concerned are you that U.S. military involvement in Nicaragua will 
get to the point where American soldiers will end up fighting in that 
country?" In each case four-fifths responded that they were somewhat 
or very concerned . The same proportion indicated in a 1986 Gallup 
poll that U.S. military aid to Central America would likely result in 
U.S. military involvement there. However, when asked in a March 1985 
ABC News poll if " the United States is heading for the same kind of 
involvement in Central America as it had in the Vietnam war or [if] 
... the United States will avoid that kind of involvement this time," 
two-thirds opted for the latter view (see Sobel 1989). 
Not in doubt is the close association between support for contra aid 
and dispositions toward these Vietnam-related ideas. Table 5-3 reports 
many of them, including questions about Vietnam from the ABC News/ 
Washington Post surveys in February and March 1985. These asked 
whether the United States should have become involved in Vietnam; 
w hether the United States should have avoided the sending of troops 
o r, instead, have "gone all out to win"; and whether American troops 
fought in a worthwhile cause. In all of the cases support for contra aid 
is related systematically to these questions in a manner consistent with 
the hard-line foreign policy belief system described above, or with what 
Brzezinski (1984) describes as "militant interventionism." 
Support for contra aid was also linked in the public psyche to per-
ceptions of the threat Central America faced. 7 Once more, by a three-
to-one margin, those who in August 1983 thought several Central American 
countries "could end up going over to the Communist camp" as a result 
of Soviet and Cuban support of Nicaragua and the guerrillas in El Salvador 
supported U.S. efforts to arm and support "the rebel s in Nicaragua who 
a re trying to overthrow the Sandinista government." Even wider mar-
gins are evident on the question of whether Nicaragua was a major 
security threat and the support accorded overthrow of the Nicaraguan 
government. In March 1986, for example, 60 percent of those who saw 
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Table 5-3 
Support for Anti-Sandinista Policies and Attitudes Regarding the 
Vietnam Analogy and the Vietnam War, 1982-86 
El Salvador and Nicaragua Another Vietnamb 
Arm and support rebels seeki ng 
overthrow of government• 
1.1 8/83 
Involvement in Central America as in Vietnam' 
Overthrow government• 
11.2 3/85 
Will End with American Soldiers Fighting Tbered 
Agree 
17% 
Same kind 
9% 
Disagree 
53% 
Will avoid 
22% 
87 
Military aid' 
111.1 5/85 
Very Somewhat 
concerned concerned 
18% 24% 
Not very 
concerned 
47% 
Not at a ll 
concerned 
5 1% 
Nonmilitary aid' 
IV. J 5/85 
IV.3 4/86 
Military and nonmilitary aid' 
V.l 4/86 
V.3 10/86 
35% 
37% 
26% 
23% 
44% 
51 % 
38% 
34% 
Military Involvement in Vietnam• 
Overthrow government• Should not have 
II % 11.2 3/85 
Use of Force in Vietnam 
Overthrow government• 
11.1 2/85 
11.2 3/85 
American Cause in Vietnamb 
Overthrow government• 
11.1 2/85 
11.2 3/85 
Avoid sending troops1 
13% 
More force' 
40% 
Worthwhile 
29% 
26% 
60% 
46% 
65% 
60% 
Should have 
33% 
63% 
30% 
57% 
68% 
All out to winr 
34% 
Less fo rce• 
14% 
Not worthwhile 
16% 
13% 
'Should the Uni ted States be involved in tryi ng to overthrow the government of Nicara-
gua , or not ? (ABC News/Washington Post). 
bU.S. invol vement in El Salvador and Nicaragua looks too much as though it could turn 
out to be anothe r Vietnam for this country. 
' Do you think the United States is heading for the same kind of involvement in Centra l 
America as it had in the Vietnam war, or do you think the United States will avoid that 
kind of involvement this time? 
•How concerned are you that U.S. military involvement in Nicaragua will get to the point 
where American soldiers wi ll end up fighting in that country? 
•Some people think we should not have become militarily involved in Vietnam, while others 
think we should have. What is your opinion? 
1Should we have used more military force, less military force, or did we use about the right 
amount [in Vietnam]? 
•Looking back, do you think the United States should have avoided sending any fighting 
troops to Vietnam, or do you think the United S tates should have sent troops but gone all 
out to win the war here? 
"'verall, would you say the Ame rican troops in Vietnam fought in a worthwhile cause or 
not? 
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Nicaragua as a major security threat to the United States sided with the 
president on the decision of the Hou se to refuse a $100 million aid 
request, compared with only 18 percent of those who thought Nicara-
gua was not a threat. Overarching these differences is the fact that 
overall the president enjoyed the support of only 28 percent of the 
respondents, a reflection of the fact that the administration 's Nicara-
guan policies never enjoyed majority support among the American people 
despite widespread public concern for the encroachment of commu-
nism and Soviet influence in Central America. 
TRUST IN LEADERSHIP AND 
SUPPORT FOR CONTRA AID 
The trust that Americans place in their leaders was buffeted by the 
Vietnam War and in turn found expression in the contra aid issue. A 
widespread decline in public confidence in American institutions and 
leaders has long been evident (Lipset and Schneider 1983, 1987; Lipset 
1985). President Carter drew attention to the trends in his 1979 " mal-
aise" speech in which he spoke of "a fundamental threat to American 
democracy" and a "crisis of confidence" reflected in "a growing dis-
respect for government and for churches and for schools, the news media 
and other institutions." Among the trends was a declining sense of political 
efficacy and a general feeling of despair, alienation, and powerless-
ness about the future. Ronald Reagan helped to rebuild public confi-
dence in political leaders, but it was dealt another blow by the revelations 
of_ the Iran-contra affair (Lipset and Schneider 1987), which once more 
rat sed concerns about the abuse of power in the name of national security. 
In early 1985, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the fall 
of Saigon, ABC News/Washington Post asked a series of questions related 
to the behavior of political leaders during the Vietnam War and of 
respondents' trust in them since. Sixty-one percent indicated they believed 
that both Johnson and Nixon "often tried to mislead" the American 
people about the Vietnam War, and two-thirds responded that the way 
the war was_ handled tended to make them "personally distrustful of 
our leaders tn Washington at the time."s Just over half also indicated 
that _they trusted leaders today about the same as they did during the 
war Itself ( 10 
h. percent trusted them less). In the same survey over two-t trds oppo d ff ' 
59 se e orts to overthrow the government in Nicaragua, but pber~ent expressed the view that "Reagan ... wants the United States 
to e tnvotved · 
•n overthrowing the government of Nicaragua." Not 
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surprisingly, a systematic examination of responses to these questions 
and others related to Central America reveals a close connection be-
tween Americans' support for contra aid, the trust they reposed in their 
political leaders, and the credibility they accorded leaders' natjonal 
security proselytism. 
CONGRESS AND CONTRA AID: A REFLECTION 
OF THE COLLECTIVE PREFERENCE? 
Differences of opinion about the representative role of members of 
Congress are as old as the Republic. The classic distinction turns on 
whether the people's representatives are to act as delegates directly 
responsive to constituency opinions or as trustees who, as argued by 
the English political theorist Edmund Burke, are to determine what the 
interests of the people are. James Madison underscored its relevance 
to members of Congress in Federalist 10 (Madison et al. 1937, 59), 
where he urged that members of Congress should be " least likely to 
sacrifice" the national interest to "local prejudice." 
Some issues of foreign policy have direct effects on constituency 
interests, but most do not. The representative function of Congress in 
foreign policy-making may therefore be appropriately regarded as one 
that promotes the collective preferences of the nation rather than a 
narrower local interest, much as Madison had urged. Even here, how-
ever, care must be taken not to distinguish too sharply between the 
delegate and trustee roles. "When members vote their own beliefs, they 
tend to be voting the beliefs of their constituencies. That members' 
attitudes sometimes conflict with those of their constituencies, and that 
in those instances they tend to vote against their constituencies, should 
not obscure the fact that most of the time their attitudes do not conflict 
with those of their constituencies and they, therefore, vote as their 
constituencies want them to. Members don't have to adopt the posi-
tions of their constituencies; they, however, often choose to adopt them" 
(Bernstein 1989, 102). 
Presidents' repeated calls for bipartisanship in foreign policy is 
effectively an appeal to the collective interest buttressed by the argu-
ment that the nation's foreign and security policy interests are too 
important to be held hostage to partisan and ideological dispute. The 
historical record indicates that bipartisan foreign policy voting has 
declined in recent years compared with the earlier postwar era, and 
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that partisan and ideological voting, while always evident, has become 
more pronounced due to the absence of the moderating effects of bi-
parti sanship (McCormick and Wittkopf 1990). Moreover, the extent of 
partisan voting in Congress generally has tended upward in recent years. 
The pres ident 's role as the nation's chief legislative officer contrib-
utes to partisan voting, inasmuch as members of the president's party 
take cues from him (Clausen 1973). The decline in bipartisan foreign 
policy voting in recent years can be linked to the growing importance 
of these partisan cues in an environment characterized by the absence 
of a foreign policy consensus. As the Reagan administration's policies 
toward Nicaragua likewise failed to enjoy widespread agreement about 
the collective interest at stake, which would otherwise lead to bipar-
ti sanship, partisan and ideological voting should have been expected. 
Thi s was indeed the case: in effect, members of Congress, whether 
acting as tru stees or delegates, expressed the will of the American people 
as reflected in mass opinion on the issue of contra aid. 
Between 1983 and 1988, Congress took 77 recorded votes on contra 
aid on which the president took a stand, 32 in the House and 45 in the 
Senate. The impact of partisanship and ideology in shaping the out-
come of these votes-which would be expected given the contours of 
public opinion-can be determined by classifying members of Con-
gress into their appropriate partisan and ideological groups and then 
comparing the average proportion of propresidential contra aid votes 
across each of the groups.9 Using a simple analysis-of-variance (ANOVA) 
procedure, the results for the Hou se are shown in Table 5-4 (those for 
the Senate are s imilar) . They indicate that, in the 98th Congress, and 
regard less of ideology, Republicans supported the president's position 
on 52 percent of the contra aid votes compared with 45 percent among 
the Democrats. Among the ideological clusters, conservatives (regard-
less of party) supported the president on 94 percent of the contra aid 
votes, whereas liberals supported his position on only 5 percent of the 
votes. The substantive message is striking: collectively partisanship 
and ideology are exceedingly potent explanations of congressional 
behavior on the issue, and they are remarkably stable explanations across 
congresses, much as public opinion was stable across time.10 
Interes ting ly, ideology matters more than party. While party differ-
ences typically account for a 10 to 20 percentage-point disparity in the 
(average) support that members of Congress gave the president on contra 
aid issues, ideology accounts for differences (on the average) of 40 
pe rcent and more. In the 99th House, for example, Democrats sup-
ported Reagan 42 percent of the time, whereas Republicans supported 
him 60 percent of the time. But liberals (after controlling for the ef-
fects of party) supported him only 12 percent of the time, whereas 
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Table 5-4 
Multivariate ANOYA and Multiple Classification Analyses 
of the Relationship between House Support for the 
President's Position on Contra Aid Votes and 
Partisanship and Ideology, 1983-88 
98th Congress 99th Congress I OOth Congress 
Mean Mean Mean 
Source of variation N (beta) N (beta) N (beta) 
430 47.8 427 49.8 425 55.5 
Party identification 
Republican 166 51.6 180 60.0 175 62.3 
Democrat 264 45.4 247 42.4 250 50.7 
91 
(0.07)* (0.20)** (0.21 )** 
Political ideology 
Conservative 164 93 .6 171 85.4 158 76.5 
Moderate 90 48.4 88 53.2 89 64.0 
Liberal 176 5.0 168 11.9 178 32.5 
(0.86)** (0. 76)•• (0.72)** 
R2 0.9 1 0.86 0.79 
Note: Cell entries are mean fore ign policy support scores. 
*Significant at p < 0.05. 
**Significant at p < 0 .01. 
conservatives supported him 85 percent of the time. The beta (stan-
dardized regression) coefficients reflect these sharp differences by showing 
that ideology is, on the average, five times as powerful as partisanship 
in explaining congressional voting behavior on the issue of contra aid 
(which is true in the Senate as well as the House). 
PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE AND 
POPULAR POLICY SUPPORT 
The once conventional wisdom about the nature of public opinion 
regarding foreign policy implies that the opinion-policy linkage is a 
top-down process, with an uninterested, ill-informed public inevitably 
subject to manipulation by elites in the sense that leaders are able to 
create public support for their policy initiatives where none exi sted 
previously. As suggested earlier, there is now considerable evidence 
that refutes those views. The American people are able to maintain 
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coherent, consistent, and politically relevant foreign policy attitudes 
and beliefs . Accordingly, the opinion-policy nexus is better conceptu-
alized as reciprocal. Still, what continues to elude scholarship is how 
these reciprocal ties manifest themselves in the policy-making pro-
cess. Clearly leadership matters, as conventional wisdom suggests , but 
public opinion also places some limits on what is acceptable behavior 
on the part of policymakers, elastic though they may be. Evaluations 
of the president 's job performance by the American people provides 
insight into the linkage process. 
Research on presidential popularity suggests that 1) the public's 
evaluation of presidential performance is significantly affected by the 
state of the nation's economy and by dramatic political events, both 
foreign and domestic, and 2) presidents care about their popularity with 
the American people because it affects their ability to work their will 
with others involved in the policy process." As Richard Neustadt observes 
in his classic study, Presidential Power (1980, 64), "The Washingto-
nians who watch a President have more to think about than his profes-
sional reputation. They also have to think about his standing with the 
public outside of Washington . They have to gauge his popular prestige. 
Because they think about it, public standing is a source of influence 
for him" (see also Kernell 1986). In short, the more popular a president 
is, the more likely he is to accomplish his poli tical agenda. This is the 
essence of what Dennis M. Simon and Charles W. Ostrom (1988) call 
"the politics of prestige." 
The effects of presidential popularity on American foreign policy 
performance are explored by Ostrom and Brian L. Job (1986), who 
conclude that popular presidents have a greater proclivity to engage in 
the use of force short of war because higher popularity levels "free" 
them from the domestic constraints that would otherwise inhibit resort 
to force. The impact of foreign policy behavior on presidential popu-
larity, on the other hand , is examined by Ostrom and Simon (1985), 
whose analysis invites the conclusion that, historically, the American 
public has rewarded a confrontational foreign and military policy by 
showing that threats, the actual use of military force, and talking tough 
to the Soviets won presidents popular approval , whereas cooperating 
with the Soviets typically cost them. Specific foreign policy events 
also frequently act as approval- or disapproval-enhancing phenomena 
(Marra, Ostrom, and Simon 1990; Ostrom and Simon 1989), as in the 
case of the Bay of Pigs fiasco during Kennedy's administration or the 
Iran-contra revelations during Reagan's. 
Although the research on presidential popularity is rich and exten-
sive, most is based on analyses of aggregate statistical data. Cross-
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sectional studies that assess the impact individual beliefs exert on 
evaluations of presidential performance or that otherwise trace the 
dynamics of subgroup evaluations of and reactions to presidential 
performance are rare (cf. Hurwitz, Peffley, and Raymond 1989; Krosnick 
and Kinder 1990). The remainder of this paper seeks to combine the 
insights of aggregate- level studies of presidential popularity with the 
advantages of individual-level analysis to assess the impact that Ameri-
cans' opinions regarding Central American policies had on their as-
sessments of Reagan's job performance. The analysis rests on the 
ass umption that a president's popularity serves as a transmission belt 
linking the prevailing climate of opinion to the larger political process 
by affecting the ability of the president to accomplish his political agenda. 
Thus the approach posits that the relationship between opinion and 
policy is an indirect one. It also recogni zes the reciprocal nature of the 
opinion-policy nexus; other things being equal, popular presidents are 
more likely to win support for specific policies than are unpopular 
presidents. 
LEADERS AND THE LED 
The hypothesis that the opinion-policy nexus is reciprocal implies 
that presidents are able to persuade and to be persuaded. The act of 
persuasion is central to the role of the president, who not only gives 
Congress cues about important issues of public policy but whose lead-
ership function vis-a-vis the American people is al so an act of cue-
giving. 
What is noteworthy about the story of contra aid is that presidential 
leadership did not- in the aggregate-have its intended effect. There 
is evidence of some increase in popular support for Reagan 's policies 
over the many years of struggle (Sobel 1989; Lockerbie and Borrelli 
1990), but the most striking fact is how little the president's efforts on 
this issue mattered. It is all the more so because of Reagan's popular 
image as " the Great Communicator" combined with evidence that he, 
like his predecessors, was able to use political drama to affect opinion 
in his direction (MacKuen 1983; Ostrom and Simon 1989; see also 
Lanoue 1989). 
At the individual level, however, Reagan 's personal popularity and 
the popularity of hi s programs were closely correlated. This is evident 
from the data in Table 5-5, which show an unambiguous link between 
positive evaluations of Reagan 's job performance and support for his 
policies on contra aid. The evidence is especially striking in the case 
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Table 5-5 
The Relationship between Support for Anti-Sandinista 
Policies and Evaluations of Reagan 's Presidential Performance 
Reagan Job Performance 
Excellent/ Poor/ 
approve Good/ Fair/ di sapprove 
strongly approve disapprove strongly 
I. Arm and support 
rebels seeking 
overthrow of 
government' 
I.l 8/83 64% 35% 19% II % 
1.2 9/83 49% 31 % 2 1% 17% 
1.3 1/84 44% 30% 23% 22% 
II. Overthrow 
government' 
11.1 2/85 36% 15% 18% 10% 
11.2 3/85 31 % 19% II % 6% 
11.3 3/86 57% 25% 17% 10% 
Ill. Military aid' 
111.1 5185 55% 27% 15% 6% 
Ill.2 3/86 62% 32% 23% 17% 
lll.4 1/87 75% 42% 17% 5% 
IV. Nonmilitary aid' 
IV. I 5/85 65% 43% 39% 22% 
lV.3 4/86 56% 44% 32% 24% 
v. Military and 
nonmilitary aid' 
V.l 4/86 70% 34% 18% 8% 
V.2 6/86 51% 30% 14% 16% 
V.3 10/86 62% 35% 16% 8% 
"See Table 5-2 for question wording. 
of the three questions in 1986 having to do with support for military 
and nonmilitary aid to the contras. The message is clear: Reagan's popu-
larity and the popularity of his policies were inextricably intertwined.12 
Partisanship and ideology, as noted earlier, were part of the complex 
mi xture affecting public attitudes toward the president and contra aid: 
If you were a Republican or conservative, you were also more likely 
to s upport both Reagan and his policies. Table 5-6 sorts out the com-
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Table 5-6 
Multivariate ANOVA and Multiple Classification Analyses 
of the Relationship between Support for $100 Million in 
Military and Nonmilitary Aid to the Contras and Evaluations of 
Reagan's Job Performance, Partisanship, and Ideology, 1986 
April 1986' October 1986" 
Mean Mean 
Source of variation N (beta) N (beta) 
1,116 1.63 1,014 1.65 
Reagan job performance 
Excellent 287 1.32 265 1.41 
Good 456 1.65 427 1.66 
Fair 226 1.81 224 1.82 
Poor 147 1.88 98 1.86 
95 
(0.41 )** (0.33)** 
Party identification 
Republican 376 1.60 371 1.62 
Independent 336 1.60 237 1.63 
Democrat 404 1.68 406 1.69 
(0.08)* (0.07)** 
Political philosophy 
Conservative 442 1.62 429 1.58 
Moderate 688 1.62 427 1.70 
Liberal 186 1.69 158 1.72 
(0.06) (0.14)** 
Rz 0.21 0.18 
Note: Cell entries are categoric means. Responses to the aid questions range from favor 
(coded I) to oppose (coded 2). 
'Do you favor or oppose sending $ 100 million in military and nonmilitary aid to the contra 
rebels in Nicaragua? 
"Congress has authorized that $100 million in military and nonmilitary aid be sent to the 
rebels fighting the government in Nicaragua. Do you favor or oppose sending that aid? 
*Significant at p < 0.05. 
**Significant at p < 0.01. 
bined impact of these complementary explanations of public support 
for contra aid using two 1986 surveys and the same ANOVA proce-
dures used earlier to explore the impact of partisanship and ideology 
on congressional voting behavior. In one survey, that of April 1986, the 
empirical results indicate that support for Reagan was the most impor-
tant factor in explaining public support for contra aid (as determined 
by the magnitude of the beta coefficients), followed at some distance 
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by partisanship. In the other, of October 1986, partisanship and ideol-
ogy were both important, but again at some distance from the president' s 
popularity as an explanation. Clearly, then, leadership affects policy 
popularity, even though in the case of contra aid it was insufficient to 
carry the day. 13 
FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES 
AND PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY 
Are presidents able to be persuaded as well as persuade? Theory and 
evidence both say yes. Table 5-7 , for example, examines the correlates 
of Reagan's job performance as measured in two ABC News/Washing-
ton Post surveys. Drawing on the insights of aggregate analyses of 
presidential popularity, respondents' evaluation of the direction of the 
economy was used as one of the predictors. As expected , it turns out 
to be quite important, even rivaling partisanship as an explanation of 
Reagan's popularity. But importantly, attitudes toward contra aid also 
make a significant contribution.14 
The evidence in Tables 5-6 and 5-7 reinforces the point that support 
for political leaders and their policies are closely intertwined, but it 
does not clarify the causal mechanism. Did those who approved of 
Reagan's job performance do so because they liked his policies, or did 
the fact that they approved of his performance also cause them to approve 
of what he wanted to do? Complex analytical procedures and excep-
tionally rich data are necessary before the correct causal inferences 
can be made. Still, theory leads to the hypothesis that attitudes toward 
policies more often shape attitudes toward leaders than vice versa. Because 
individuals ' opinions regarding specific foreign policy issues are lodged 
within logically antecedent belief systems that enable individuals to 
order perceptions into meaningful guides to behavior, beliefs about 
foreign policy should be related systematically to preferences regard-
ing particular policies. They should also predict evaluations of presi-
dential performance and, in the context of a reciprocal relationship 
between opi nion and policy, act as filters in sorting and screening 
presidential efforts to persuade. 15 Because beliefs are not easily changed, 
presidential policy initiatives at variance with established beliefs-as 
the Reagan administration's policies toward Nicaragua were-will 
encounter resistance. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Reagan administration's Central American policies were played 
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Table 5-7 
Multivariate ANOVA and Multiple Classification Analyses of the 
Relationship between Evaluations of Reagan's Job Performance and 
Attitudes toward Nicaragua Policy, Evaluations of the Economy, 
Partisanship, and Ideology, 1985 and 1986 
February 1985' June 1986b 
Mean Mean 
Source of variation N (beta) N (beta) 
1,029 2.25 1,070 2.14 
Overthrow government/ 
contra aid 
Favor 226 2.05 372 1.88 
Oppose 803 2.31 698 2.27 
(0.10) (0.17) 
Direction of economy 
Better 446 1.80 377 1.80 
Same 330 2.29 403 2.03 
Worse 253 2.98 290 2.69 
(0.4 1) (0.33) 
Party identification 
Republican 289 1.68 365 1.67 
Independent 357 2.25 330 2.11 
Democrat 383 2.68 375 2.57 
(0.35) (0.34) 
Political philosophy 
Conservative 302 2.10 338 2.02 
Moderate 462 2.24 458 2.10 
Liberal 265 2.43 274 2.35 
(0.11) (0. 12) 
R2 0.47 0.41 
Note: Cell entries are categoric means. Evaluations of Reagan range from excellent (coded 
I ) to poor (coded 4) All differences between or among them are statistically significant at 
p < 0.01. 
•Should the United States be involved in trying to overthrow the government of Nicaragua 
or not? 
bOo you generally favor or oppose the United States granting military and other aid to the 
Nicaraguan rebels known as the "contras"? 
out in a variety of settings. With the defeat of Daniel Ortega in the 
Nicaraguan presidential elections in February 1990, supporters of those 
policies could claim a measure of victory. But a retrospective judg-
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ment on the battle over contra aid at home leaves little doubt that the 
president failed to win the support he sought, despite the expenditure 
of considerable presidential capital. This analysis of the climate of 
opinion in which the battle was waged , as well as the more immediate 
political environment toward which that climate of opinion contrib-
uted, yields important insight into the role that public opinion plays in 
shaping American foreign policy. 
First, it is clear that foreign policy beliefs today are more coherent 
and predictable than many analysts have heretofore suggested. The 
Vietnam War caused a breakdown of the Cold War internationalist 
consensus, and its residue, particularly as it relates to public attitudes 
toward the use of force and interventionism, remains a potent force in 
the American polity. The consequence is that the mass public is now 
inclined toward selective internationalism. Put differently, the case of 
contra aid is both a product and an illustration of the impact of the 
Vietnam syndrome. The time-worn aphorism that politics stops at the 
water's edge no longer applies, as the apparent intensification of par-
tisan and ideological differences long evident on domestic political 
issues increasingly color foreign policy issues as well. The pronounced 
differences on attitudes toward contra aid among various partisan iden-
tifiers and ideological groups bears this out. Internationalism now wears 
two faces, a militant one and a cooperative one, and the public mood, 
once thought to be fickle and unstable, has crystallized and is firmly 
anchored. 16 
Second, public opinion mattered in the domestic battle over contra 
aid. In a very real sense congressional behavior mirrored the attitudes 
consistently expressed by the public on the issue. In the aggregate, 
members of Congress transmitted the collective preferences of the 
American people into the policy-making process almost as though they 
were instructed delegates, and despite the fact that their behavior was 
at variance with the preferences of a generally popular president. More 
abstractly, members of Congress expressed the dominant, anti -inter-
ventionist climate of opinion evident since American withdrawal from 
Vietnam which dogged an administration determined, if left to its own 
devices, to do more. In this way the climate of opinion constrained the 
policy options available to the administration to cope with the Sandinistas 
and motivated Congress, as a body, to moderate the administration's 
policy preferences. 
This is not to say that public preferences were effectively expressed 
in each case that the Congress confronted. After all, Congress did provide 
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some funding, and public opinion on this issue, like others, served as 
a poor guide to the precise course of action on specific issues that 
policymakers typically face daily. But the fact that the public embraced 
a consistent and predictable disposition toward noninvolvement over 
a prolonged period doubtless assisted the Congress as it considered 
specific requests for various levels and types of funding. Thus, while 
the causal linkage is unclear, we can assert that Congress represented 
the collective preference expressed in public attitudes. 
Third, public opinion also mattered in that it affected evaluations of 
the president. The relationship between policy and opinion has long 
been thought of as a top-down process, with public attitudes easily 
manipulated by elites. In fact, however, the American people maintain 
coherent foreign policy beliefs which affect their evaluations of poli-
cies and policymakers alike and undermine the leader-driven, top-down 
process of opinionation. The nexus between policy and opinion is therefore 
better conceptualized as reciprocal. We posit that the causal linkage 
from opinion to policy is an indirect one mediated through evaluations 
of presidential performance. Presidents care about their standing with 
the American people because it affects presidents' ability to work their 
will with others, notably members of Congress. Because they care, the 
American people are able to affect presidents' polic ies and behavior. 
In this way public opinion comes to play an important, albeit indirect, 
role in shaping the nation's conduct abroad. In the specific case of 
contra aid, the climate of opinion militated against the Reagan 
administration's preferences for a more assertive policy. 
Public opinion was clearly opposed to contra aid throughout the Reagan 
presidency. It was also divided about the wisdom of militant interven-
tionism generally, and of intervention in Central America in particular. 
Reagan's strongest supporters were among the strongest proponents of 
involvement; conversely, his strongest detractors were leas t supportive 
of the range of available interventionist strategies. How much those 
factors directly affected policy choices contemplated by the White House 
remains to be determined, but this was hardly an environment ripe for 
policy consensus. This is so because divisions over the interventionist 
thrust characteristic of post-World War II American foreign policy lie 
at the core of the breakdown of the Cold War foreign policy consensus 
and are now deeply embedded in the domestic climate of opinion about 
America's world role. At the aggregate level Reagan generally enjoyed 
widespread popular support, but the sources of that support closely 
tracked partisan and ideological lines. Reagan's policy preferences 
regarding Nicaragua tended to exacerbate rather than ameliorate these 
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divisions, and his popularity in the domestic political system as a whole 
doubtless suffered as a result. Thus the story of contra aid is a story 
of policy failure in that the president failed to alter the dominant cli-
mate of opinion and thus failed to realize domestic support for his 
objectives. But it is also a story of success in that the American people 
effectively constrained the range of the president's viable policy choices. 
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I. This chapter uses the term "contra aid" in a generic sense to refer to 
all efforts by the Reagan administration to support the insurgents opposed to 
the Sandinista regime and otherwise to bring pressure to bear on the regime. 
The term refers to five ways in which public opinion questions were formu-
lated: namely, efforts by the United States to I) arm and 2) support the rebels 
seeking to overthrow the Sandinista government; U.S. involvement in 3) try-
ing to overthrow the government in Nicaragua; and sending 4) military and/ 
or 5) nonmilitary aid to the contras. Technically the Reagan administration 
never embraced overthrow of the Sandinista regime as official policy, al-
though it came c lose to doing so on several occasions. Furthermore, a number 
of specific actions, such as CIA-backed efforts to mine the harbors of Nica-
ragua and to supply arms to the contras at the time the Boland amendment 
restrictions were operative, could have been interpreted in the public eye as 
efforts to overthrow the government. 
2. The analytical utili ty of the concept has been demonstrated by Cohen 
(1957) and Lepper (1971). 
3. The cooperative (CI) and militant internationalism (MI) constructs were 
first derived from the quadrennial studies of mass foreign policy attitudes 
sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) beginning in 
late 1974. See Rielly (1975, 1979, 1983, 1987) for discussions of the CCFR 
surveys and Maggi otto and Wittkopf ( 1981), Wittkopf ( 1981, 1986, 1987, 
1990a), and Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1983a, 1983b) for discussions of the 
CIIMI construct as it evolved through various iterations of these surveys. 
Additional evidence for cooperative and militant internationalism as domi-
nant modes of thinking about foreign policy can be found in Hinckley (1988a) 
and Holsti and Rosenau ( 1988, 1990). 
4. Reagan used the phrases "our brothers" and "freedom fighters" on nu-
merous occasions and often referred to Cuba. The term "new isolationists" 
was used in a nationwide address on May 9, 1984, while the "history will 
hold them accountable" judgment was contained in his remarks before Jewish 
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leaders at a White House briefing on March 5, 1986. These same remarks also 
included the reference to Khadafy and the Ayatollah, while the reference to 
Harlingen, Texas, was contained in Reagan's remarks to contra supporters at 
the White House on March 3, 1986. The official documents containing the 
quotations from the president cited in this paragraph can be found in Public 
Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan ( 1988). 
5. According to the Congressional Research Service (Copson 1988, 4), 
U.S. contra aid from 1981 through 1984 was estimated to be $72 million, $62 
million of which was provided by Congress and $10 million of which came 
from CIA discretionary funds (cf. Serafino 1989). In the period from 1985 to 
early 1988, Congress provided $130 million, and contributions to the contras 
from private sources were estimated to have been as high as $25 million. In 
addition, the congressional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair 
reported that $3.8 million of the $16 million in profits from the sale of arms 
to Iran was diverted to the contras (U.S. Congress L987a, 307, 436; Sobel 
1993, 7). 
6. Differences among elites are equally striking. Using a somewhat dif-
ferent methodology to delineate the fourfold belief system typology based on 
the CI/MI construct described above, Holsti and Rosenau ( 1990, 114) found 
that more than 80 percent of the hardliners in their 1984 sample of American 
leaders agreed with the Reagan administration's policy of supporting the contras, 
but that only 14 percent of the accommodationists did so. Similar proportions 
characterized the differences among elites on the issue of sending military 
advisers to El Salvador (which the Reagan administration did in 1981). 
7. In April 1988 the Americans Talk Security ( 1989, 292) project asked 
about the problems facing Central American countries. Illegal drug traffick-
ing was deemed "very serious" by 87 percent of the respondents , followed by 
poverty (81 percent), government corruption (73 percent), military-run gov-
ernments (57 percent), communism (55 percent), and U.S. interference in their 
affairs (34 percent). Earlier, in April 1984, a CBS News/New York Times 
survey asked: "Which do you think has more to do with the political unrest 
in Central America-is it more because of influence by Communi sts, or is it 
more because the people are very poor?" The communists and poverty came 
in about the same (38 versus 37 percent), and I 0 percent of the respondents 
ascribed the causes to the two sources equally ( 15 percent had no opinion). 
8. In an Americans Talk Security (1989, 175) survey in December 1988, 
70 percent of those interviewed agreed with the proposition that "The Viet-
nam War showed the American people that U.S. officials who are deeply involved 
in conducting the war cannot be trusted to give reliable information to the 
public." 
9. Ideology was measured by grouping members of Congress into one of 
three ideological categories-conservative, moderate, or liberal-on the ba-
sis of their voting record as rated by the Americans for Democratic Action 
(ADA). The members within each group for each administration were deter-
mined by pooling the data for the relevant Congresses for each president. 
The categories themselves were derived as follows . First, a mean ADA score 
was calculated for each chamber and each Congress. Conservatives were then 
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defined as those members whose ADA scores were more than half a standard 
deviation below the mean for each chamber and Congress; moderates as those 
whose ADA scores were equal to or within half a standard deviation above 
or below the mean; and liberals as those whose ADA scores were more than 
half a standard deviation above the mean. 
I 0. The legislative-executive battle over El Salvador was a precursor to 
the contra aid battle, much as public opinion on contra aid was anticipated by 
public opinion toward El Salvador. Senator Jesse Helms (R., N.C.) proposed 
an amendment to the foreign aid authorization bill in 1981 that was effec-
tively a vote on military aid to El Salvador. Similarly, he proposed an amendment 
to a continuing appropriations bill in 1982 that also was an El Salvador aid 
vote. Both were supported by margins of 75 to 80 percent by Republicans but 
by less than I 0 to 36 percent by Democrats. Both were also supported over-
whelmingly by conservatives and opposed overwhelmingly by liberals. 
II. Among the extensive research on presidential popularity, Mueller's ( 1970, 
1973) is especially noteworthy in that it seeks explicitly to incorporate for-
eign policy variables in models of presidential performance. Other relevant 
studies include Hibbs (I 982a, 1982b), Hurwitz and Peffley ( 1987), Kernell 
( 1978), Lanoue ( 1989), Marra, Ostrom, and Simon ( 1990), and Ostrom and 
Simon ( 1985, 1989). Fluctuations in presidential popularity, in tum, have 
been shown to be related to congressional support of presidents' domestic 
and foreign policies (Bond, Fleisher, and Northrup 1988; Edwards 1981 , 1985, 
1989; but cf. Bond and Fleisher 1990) and to the outcomes of congressional 
and presidential elections (Abramowitz 1985; Kernell 1977; Lewis-Beck and 
Rice 1982). Edwards ( 1990) usefully summari zes and critiques much of the 
research on the correlates and consequences of presidential popularity. 
12. That conclusion is supported by other evidence. For example, the Oc-
tober I 983 Harris poll taken shortly after the invasion of Grenada found that 
more than 90 percent of those who rated Reagan's overall handling of the 
presidency as good or excellent supported the invasion, but only half of those 
who rated his performance as poor to fair supported it. 
13. Questions from three of the Harris surveys used elsewhere in this paper 
that asked respondents to react to a range of Central American policy options 
were used to create more general attitude scales reasonably interpreted as 
measuring attitudes toward intervention in Central America. These were used 
together with partisanship and ideology in a dummy variable regression model 
as an alternative way to examine the impact of foreign policy beliefs on Reagan' s 
popularity . The results demonstrate that those more strongly oriented toward 
intervention in Central America were also more likely to evaluate Reagan 
positively, even after controlling for their political orientations. This fits with 
other evidence in this paper and reinforces the general notion that Reagan 
drew his greatest foreign policy support from those inclined toward militant 
interventionism. The reverse side, of course, is that those opposed to inter-
vention in Central America-which we can assume to be a predisposition 
firmly in place before Reagan's election-were inclined to give Reagan low 
marks on his job performance. It was this unfavorable s ide of the political 
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environment, sustained by the post- Vietnam climate of opinion, that worked 
against realization of the administration's policy preferences. 
14. The interaction between party and contra aid is significant at p < 0.05 
in the model for 1986. For the other model the interaction between party and 
the economy variable and between party and ideology is significant at p S 
0.01. 
15. See Wittkopf ( 1990) for an examination of the relationship between 
foreign policy beliefs and attitudes toward particular foreign policy issues 
and popular evaluations of political leaders. 
16 . Whether the bifurcation of the internationalist attitudes of the Ameri-
can people will persist in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf crisis and war of 
1990-91 remains to be seen. For some preliminary evidence that suggests it 
will, see Wittkopf ( 1994, forthcoming). 
